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THE THURGOOD MARSHALL LECTURE
MARSHALL AS A JUDGE
Robert Post*
It is a great privilege to inaugurate the annual Thurgood Marshall Lecture
at the Second Circuit.1 I am grateful to the court for making this lecture
possible, and to Chief Judge Katzmann and Judge Parker for this wonderful
invitation.
Marshall is a towering and inspirational figure in the history of American
constitutional law. He changed American life forever and unquestionably
for the better. But the contemporary significance of Marshall’s legacy is also,
in ways that challenge present practices and beliefs, ambiguous.
In this Lecture, I hope to explore that significance by asking which aspects
of Marshall’s historic career the Second Circuit means to honor in
establishing this Lecture series. Does the Second Circuit mean to celebrate
Marshall primarily for his accomplishments before coming on to the bench
or also, and equally, for his achievements as a judge and as a justice?
Marshall always had great affection for the Second Circuit. As of course
you know, he served as a judge here from 1961 to 1965. In 1972, five years
after he joined the Supreme Court, he became your circuit justice. At your
centennial anniversary in 1991, he expressed without reservation “my
admiration of this great court.”2 “To me,” he said, “the Second Circuit stands
out among all other courts of appeals for the quality of its contributions to
the American legal system.”3 “Any discussion of the Second Circuit must
start,” he added, “with its brilliant judges.”4 “The Second Circuit has been
home to such legendary figures as Learned Hand, Augustus Hand, Charles
Clark, Jerome Frank, and Henry Friendly,” who have endowed the circuit
with “an unrivaled reputation for judicial craftmanship and scholarship.”5
* Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I am grateful for the indispensable research
and assistance of Allaya Lloyd, without whom this lecture would not have been possible. I
am also grateful for the perceptive advice and comments of Guido Calabresi, Owen Fiss, Paul
Gewirtz, and Deborah Rhode.
1. This lecture was given on December 12, 2018, at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse.
2. Thurgood Marshall, Introductory Remarks: Celebrating the Second Circuit
Centennial, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 645, 645 (1991).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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The puzzle I mean to explore is provoked by the words of Marshall’s
generous praise, for Marshall himself would seem to fit oddly in the list of
judges that he proposes exemplifies the pantheon of the Second Circuit. At
the dedication of this magnificent Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse in 2003, Chief Judge John Walker characterized Marshall as “the
conscience of the Second Circuit.”6 That appellation seems to me true, but
it is not one that could comfortably be applied to figures like Learned Hand
or Jerome Frank or Henry Friendly, who are instead exemplary precisely
because, in Marshall’s words, of their “[u]nrivaled reputation for judicial
craftmanship and scholarship.”7 Marshall’s greatness, by contrast, would
appear to lie in a different dimension altogether. It would seem to lie in the
connections that he sought to forge between justice and the perception of
justice, a subject rarely theorized by sitting judges.
A clue to the conventional appreciation of Marshall’s unique stature may
be found in the many tributes he received after he stepped down from the
bench. The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, for example, wrote:
“Thurgood Marshall is unique because of his major contributions to
constitutional law before becoming a member of the Court. . . . These efforts
alone would entitle him to a prominent place in American history had he
never entered upon judicial service.”8 It is striking that Rehnquist had little
if anything to say about Marshall’s judicial opinions, with which he so often
disagreed. Instead, he praised Marshall’s personal bravery, determination,
and enormous strategic intelligence in planning and executing a campaign to
end state-imposed segregation, which was a great stain on the nation’s soul.
It is beyond question that Marshall’s life before becoming a judge is the
stuff of legends. As a lawyer for the NAACP and the Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Marshall traveled throughout the South defending blacks
in criminal trials that were little more than legalized murder. He was a firstrate trial lawyer. His tales of being nearly lynched, of being run out of town,
of being hidden and smuggled across county lines, of cross-examining hostile
white sheriffs in front of hostile white juries and hostile white judges, are
profiles in grit, determination, and courage.
Marshall also planned, supervised, and implemented large national legal
campaigns to end pay differentials between black and white teachers, to end
the white primary, to end racially restrictive covenants, to end segregation in
professional schools, and, finally, to integrate elementary and secondary
education. The range and impact of Marshall’s work beggars description. It
made him arguably the greatest lawyer of the twentieth century.
But to praise Marshall for his lawyering is quite different than to praise
him for his judging. The question I’d like to discuss today is whether we
6. Chief Judge John M. Walker, Jr., Opening Remarks and Introductions at the
Dedication Ceremony for the United States Courthouse 5 (Apr. 14, 2003) (quoting Judge
James L. Oakes) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
7. Marshall, supra note 2, at 645.
8. William H. Rehnquist, Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1213,
1213 (1992).

2019]

THURGOOD MARSHALL LECTURE

3

ought equally to celebrate Marshall for his work on the bench. That question
cannot be answered until we appreciate exactly how Marshall’s unique style
of judging gave jurisprudential expression to his experience as a preeminent
civil rights activist.
* * *
Before becoming a judge, Marshall had been far more than merely a superb
lawyer. As Marshall’s first law clerk, your colleague and mine, Judge Ralph
Winter, rightly tells us, Marshall was also “a civil rights leader”:
With the intensity of his convictions and the aid of his extraordinary
personality, he enlisted white political and other leaders . . . in his cause
and relentlessly addressed groups across the country with the theme that
equal rights under law was not the cause of one group but was in the interest
of all citizens. He thus was a major figure in making civil rights a part of
mainstream American values.9

I should add to Winter’s characterization that Marshall’s task was not
merely to enlist the backing of white leaders, or even of black leaders, but
also that of the African American communities who were his clients
throughout the South. Marshall knew full well that he could not bring
lawsuits without what he called the “full support from the Negro
community,”10 who, in Southern and border states, despite “facing threats of
firing, or beating or even death, continue[d] to sign the legal petitions and
complaints” that were the lifeblood of Marshall’s work.11 He crisscrossed
the country, holding mass meetings to inspire NAACP chapters and members
to support his legal efforts, all the time making clear that “the N.A.A.C.P.
and its legal staff can move no faster than the people themselves.”12
Marshall’s practice as a lawyer was forever dependent on his ability to
mobilize his clients in the service of legal reform. As an activist, therefore,
Marshall cut quite a different figure than Martin Luther King. Marshall the
lawyer addressed the public precisely to change the legal system. “What is
striking to me is the importance of law in determining the condition of the
Negro,”13 Marshall told the White House Conference on Civil Rights in
1966, in a speech whose starkly juricentric focus reportedly infuriated

9. Ralph K. Winter, TM’s Legacy, 101 YALE L.J. 25, 27 (1991).
10. THURGOOD MARSHALL, An Evaluation of Recent Efforts to Achieve Racial Integration
in Education Through Resort to the Courts, in THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS SPEECHES,
WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND REMINISCENCES 145, 146 (Mark V. Tushnet ed.,
2001).
11. The Law: The Tension of Change, TIME, Sept. 19, 1955, at 23.
12. Thurgood Marshall, Preliminary Statement of Thurgood Marshall at the Texas State
Conference of Branches at Denison, Texas 5 (Sept. 5, 1947) (on file with the Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
Records, Box II: A535, Folder 1).
13. Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the White House
Conference: “To Fulfill These Rights” 52 (June 1, 1966) (transcript available at
http://www2.mnhs.org/library/findaids/00442/pdfa/00442-01894.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ED9-LT6L]).
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King.14 “I submit that the history of the Negro demonstrates the importance
of getting rid of hostile laws and seeking the security of new friendly
laws. . . . I have faith in the efficacy of law. Perhaps that is because I am a
lawyer and not a missionary.”15 Reform for Marshall was not real until it
was embodied in law, legislative or judicial.
Martin Luther King, by contrast, was a missionary. He was a minister and
a theologian. He sought to reform the soul; law was merely epiphenomenal.
What mattered to King were conscience and values. Civil disobedience and
protests were tests of character—of moral orientation. Change required
regeneration, not merely legislation. King embraced whatever strategies
would inspire ethical rebirth. King touched a larger nerve than Marshall,
who was in a sense willing to settle for less.
Marshall frequently found King’s tactics distasteful, because Marshall’s
commitment to law was fundamental and conservative. It came directly from
Marshall’s experience fighting racial oppression. He had good reason to
regard law as a shield for the powerless. When violence prevented
desegregation after Brown II16 in Mississippi, Marshall proclaimed in disgust
that “[t]his atmosphere of lawlessness must be changed.”17 “Degrees of
defiance of the law of the land are unimportant,” he said.18 “Defiance of the
law of the land in any form is dangerous to the country.”19
Marshall stuck to his guns as legality became less fashionable in the 1960s.
He incurred the wrath of militants in 1969 when, in a famous address at
Dillard University, he affirmed: “I am a man of law, and in my book anarchy
is anarchy is anarchy. It makes no difference who practices anarchy. It’s
bad, and punishable and should be punished.”20
Marshall’s profound and constitutive commitment to law arose because he
had survived his perilous journeys throughout the South in part because of
law—at least what remained of law in the apartheid South. He had succeeded
in his quest for civil rights because, in his view, federal judges considered
themselves bound by the rule of law. “[T]hat’s the great benefit of lifetime
appointments,” Marshall would later say.21

14. Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, The Civil Rights Parley: Peaceful, Unproductive,
LOUISVILLE TIMES, June 8, 1966.
15. Marshall, supra note 13, at 53–55.
16. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
17. Thurgood Marshall, Special Counsel, NAACP, Speech at the AFL-CIO Convention 2
(Dec. 7, 1955) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People Records, Box II: A535, Folder 6).
18. Thurgood Marshall, Special Counsel, NAACP, Brainwashing with a Vengeance,
Address at the Virginia State Conference of NAACP Branches, Charlottesville, Virginia 5
(Oct. 9, 1955) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People Records, Box II: A535, Folder 6).
19. Id.
20. A Supreme Court Justice’s Warning to Fellow Negroes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
May 19, 1969, at 92.
21. “The Reminiscences of Thurgood Marshall” (Columbia Oral History Research
Office, 1977), in THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS,
AND REMINISCENCES, supra note 10, at 413, 456 [hereinafter Reminiscences]. Marshall
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One must not think, however, that Marshall failed to appreciate the
contributions of King. In 1976, Marshall observed that the “change from the
legal movement in the courts, to the protest movement in the streets, to the
legislative halls”22 had been decisive because “it reached people’s
consciousness.”23 Marshall believed that protests and demonstrations had
“saved” the civil rights movement, which otherwise “[m]ight have died on
the vine. We knew in the beginning that the courts could not solve the
problem, because the courts just don’t have that authority. It’s the public, the
minds, the souls of the people that have to do it, and you do that with
protest.”24
Marshall had learned the limits of judicial authority through his persistent
and uphill efforts to enforce Brown II in courts of law. Marshall told Dennis
Hutchinson in 1979 that
the biggest mistake he made was assuming that once Jim Crow was
deconstitutionalized, the whole structure would collapse—“like pounding
recalled an encounter with a federal judge regarding a case in Norfolk to equalize teachers’
salaries:
[W]hen [the judge] came in, I said, “Well, Judge, I noticed your case is set for
Lincoln’s Birthday. And this is a federal court.”
He said, “Well, you follow Lincoln’s Birthday up your way—down here, we
follow Jeff Davis day. . . .”
So I knew where I stood then. Then, he just ripped at everything I said. . . . [A]nd
it was rough. And he ruled against me. And we carried the case to [the] Court of
Appeals of the Fourth Circuit . . . and they reversed him, and said that he was wrong,
and that the Negro teachers have to get the same salary as the white teachers.
When we went back and filed our papers, the superintendent of schools said, “I
will not be a party to paying a n[—] the same money I pay a white person. And I
refuse to do it.”
So we filed contempt proceedings before this same judge, and we had a hearing
in his chambers, and he said, “Mr. Marshall,” this is the same judge who really tore
into me before and ruled against me. He said, “You have asked in very broad
language for contempt, and I don’t know whether you want civil or criminal. Which
do you want?”
I said, “Well, Judge, I thought I drew it that way so that you could take your
choice.”
He said, “Then I’m asking you, which do you want?”
I said, “I see nothing to be gained by putting a man in jail. Furthermore, his age
is against that.” The guy was way up in his sixties. “So I’m perfectly willing to go
with civil, if it’s all right with you.”
He said, “Let me ask you a question.”
....
He said, “Did you know that’s my best friend?”
I said, “No, sir. I did not.”
He said, “Well, despite that, I’m going to go with you. I’m not going to put him
in jail.”
That’s the same man. He was getting ready to put his best friend in jail. Because,
you see, in his mind, the law had changed. He thought the law was one way. When
the court of appeals tells him the law is the other way, that’s the way he went. . . .
I’m for federal judges.
Id. at 457–58.
22. Id. at 476.
23. Id. at 479.
24. Id.
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a stake in Dracula’s heart.” But in the twelve months between Brown I and
Brown II, he realized that he had yet to win anything. He drove the point
home . . . and concluded [the] conversation, by comparing how he felt the
day after Brown I in 1954 and after Brown II in 1955: “In 1954, I was
delirious. What a victory! I thought I was the smartest lawyer in the entire
world. In 1955, I was shattered. They gave us nothing and then told us to
work for it. I thought I was the dumbest Negro in the United States.”25

It would take the explosive political protests of the early 1960s to prompt the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, as Archibald Cox wisely
observed, made “the principle of Brown v. Board of Education . . . more
firmly law.”26
Marshall was therefore perfectly aware of the difference between social
mobilization that aimed at a moral renewal beyond the law, and social
mobilization that sought instead to channel legal institutions and decisionmaking. His life’s work lay with the latter, and it is precisely this experience
that Marshall brought to his judicial work as a judge and as a justice.
* * *
The question I wish to explore is how this experience shaped Marshall’s
practice of judging. We can begin to formulate an answer to that question by
observing that someone who strives to achieve fundamental legal changes
will always have an ambiguous relationship to law. Such a person must
necessarily see law as malleable, as subject to transformation under pressure.
That is because their entire project is to alter the substance of the law.
Yet such a person also wants to achieve legal change, as distinct from the
kind of moral regeneration to which King aspired. Hence such a person must
also value the stability, predictability, and solidity of law. Law must matter
to them because, as Marshall saw in the federal judges before whom he
appeared, it is binding.27
A legal change agent must thus experience law as both plastic and
entrenched. Marshall’s understanding of constitutional law is rife with this
paradox. Marshall is of course now best known and celebrated for having
revolutionized our understanding of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. He began his legal career under the “separate but
equal” regime of Plessy v. Ferguson.28 At the outset, he had sought to
implement Nathan Margold’s plan, which aimed to force states to actually
equalize resources invested in white and black institutions, in the full
expectation that the cost of doing so would force states to abandon dual
facilities.29 But ultimately he repudiated that plan’s reliance on Plessy and
25. Dennis J. Hutchinson, A Century of Social Reform: The Judicial Role, 4 GREEN BAG
2D 157, 168 (2001).
26. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term—Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 94 (1966).
27. See Reminiscences, supra note 21, at 456–57.
28. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
29. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961 12–13, 123–25 (1994).
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achieved in Brown I his long-treasured goal of having the Court declare that
“separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”30
Although the Supreme Court now proclaims that “Plessy was wrong the
day it was decided,”31 that is merely post hoc rationalization. It is law-office
history, not history. It is not what Chief Justice Earl Warren, who was far
closer to the issue, actually said in Brown I. Plessy had been the law of the
land for more than half a century, and the authors of the Southern Manifesto
could, with undoubted accuracy, proclaim in the halls of Congress that Plessy
had become “a part of the life of the people of many of the States and
confirmed their habits, customs, traditions, and way of life.”32 Throughout
the nation, Plessy was the Constitution.
Marshall’s undying achievement is to have changed all that, through legal
methods and legal strategy. “The extreme right wing of reaction wants to
retain the status quo regardless of any other considerations,” he said in 1950.
The extreme left wing would destroy our entire system, the good and the
bad, with one stroke. The true liberal believes that it is important to use all
of our legal machinery to correct the evils now present and at the same time
to carry on a steady campaign of education. Our legal machinery requires
a step by step procedure.33

Using that procedure, Marshall revised the meaning of our constitutional
texts. And yet in 1955, having just fundamentally altered the import of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Marshall could declare in perfect good faith that
[t]he difference between the Constitution and the law is something a lot of
people don’t seem to appreciate. The law can fluctuate because of the
changing whims of the people and their legislators. But the whole purpose
of the Constitution is to serve as an instrument which cannot be changed
overnight, which does not change when mores and customs change.34

The point here is not to catch Marshall in some logical contradiction. The
point is rather that any figure who seeks legal transformation will always be
caught in this same paradox. They must seek to alter law while
simultaneously prizing law’s institutional solidity. A legal change agent will
always want their own alteration of the law to be respected and enforced in
ways that they have refused to enforce and respect existing law. This is a
tension that they must resolve.
Marshall’s solution to the problem was to appeal to the basic democratic
structure of American government, to what he called “the imperatives of our
whole national existence.”35 He knew full well, as all of us do, that the
30. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
31. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992).
32. 102 CONG. REC. 4516 (1956) (statement of Rep. Smith).
33. Thurgood Marshall, Special Counsel, NAACP, Significance of the Recent Supreme
Court Decisions, Speech at Fisk University 17 (July 5, 1950) (on file with the Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
Records, Box II: A535, Folder 5).
34. The Law: The Tension of Change, supra note 11.
35. Thurgood Marshall, Special Counsel, NAACP, Remarks at the Herbert Lehman
Dinner, Hotel Roosevelt 3 (Feb. 3, 1956) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript
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holdings of the Supreme Court change from decade to decade. But the
democratic constitutional structure of the nation, Marshall believed, was
endowed with a more stable, a more permanent significance. He pushed to
change law in order to recover that significance. Marshall sought to return
our constitutional law to what he regarded as its original and pristine
meaning.
In a remarkable, unpublished cri du coeur entitled We Are Not Alone,
Marshall wrote:
The essence of democratic government is the right to complete
equality. The Negro sharecropper’s baby born in the most miserable shack
in Mississippi, at his birth is endowed with e[x]actly the same rights,
privileges and immunities as a child born to the wealthiest parents in the
most palatial mansion in America. Many of these rights privileges and
immunities are not derived from any written statute but arise from being
born into a democracy. I am talking now of basic principles. Either we
have these rights or we do not have a democracy. We either enforce these
rights or we will never have a democracy.
But somewhere along the hard road which led us from the past, we
have lost sight of some of these principles and what is more important—
we have lost the courage to attain them.36

Marshall believed that the Reconstruction Amendments “were passed in the
high hope of achieving these principles.”37 Marshall explicitly understood
himself to be participating in the “battle” to “implement” those Amendments
“by legal action so that someday, at long last, these principles will become
the meaning as well as the letter of the law.”38
For Marshall, therefore, constitutional stability lay in the fundamental
principles of American democracy, not in the mere letter of the law, not in
the mere pronouncements of the Supreme Court. Legal forms required
respect and obedience, as did the decrees and judgments of courts, but
ultimately the task of constitutional reform was to reinvigorate the principles
that underlay the structure of our government and that were therefore
immanent in the American constitutional system. In Marshall’s eyes, the job
of constitutional law was forever to work itself pure to express the dazzling
meaning of these principles. Just as King in his “I Have a Dream” speech
had read the Constitution as “a promissory note” in default,39 so Marshall

Division, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Records, Box III:
A310, Folder 7).
36. Thurgood Marshall, We Are Not Alone: Discrimination Against Minorities Other
Than Negro 3–4 (1947) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People Records, Box II: A72, Folder 6).
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id.
39. Martin Luther King, Jr., “I Have a Dream . . . ,” Speech at the March on Washington
for Jobs and Freedom 1 (Aug. 28, 1963) (transcript available at https://
www.archives.gov/files/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7WN-RN8N]).
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read the Constitution on its bicentennial as the site of “promises not
fulfilled.”40
* * *
This is the experience Marshall brought with him as he crossed from the
bar to the bench. This experience influenced how he judicially interpreted
and applied the Constitution. As a judge, Marshall sought always to read the
Constitution in light of its immanent democratic principles. He thus
understood the Constitution to promise, as he said in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,41 the attainment of “[a] fully integrated
society, one in which the color of a person’s skin will not determine the
opportunities available to him or her.”42
The fulfillment of that constitutional promise was not to be measured in
abstract rules of positive law, but instead in the life experiences of average
citizens, the kind of persons whom Marshall had spent a lifetime representing
and mobilizing. The meaning of the Constitution lay in its effect on the actual
lives of ordinary persons. Marshall insisted, as he said in his great dissent in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,43 that judges ought not close their “eyes
to . . . constitutional history and social reality.”44
Nowhere is this focus more evident than in Marshall’s moving dissent in
Milliken v. Bradley,45 the decision in which the Court held that a district court
could not order an interdistrict remedy to desegregate inner-city Detroit
schools, even though in the absence of such an interdistrict remedy it would
not be possible meaningfully to desegregate Detroit schools.46 The holding
of the Court was that the scope and nature of the constitutional violation
determined the reach of equitable remedies,47 and that therefore in the
absence of a showing that surrounding suburban districts had themselves
violated the Constitution or were materially affected by the consequences of
past violations, a court was powerless to involve these independent suburban
districts in a remedy.48
Marshall was outraged, viewing the decision as an “emasculation of our
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.”49 What mattered
to him was purely and simply the effect of the remedy on the lives of black
students. The Court’s holding, Marshall said, guarantees that African
American students in Detroit “will continue to perceive their schools as
segregated educational facilities and this perception will only be increased
40. Thurgood Marshall, Commentary, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States
Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987).
41. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
42. Id. at 401 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
44. Id. at 558 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
46. Id. at 739–45.
47. Id. at 744–45.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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when whites react to a Detroit-only decree by fleeing to the suburbs to avoid
integration.”50 Marshall grimly and accurately prophesized, “[i]n the short
run, it may seem to be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas
to be divided up each into two cities—one white, the other black—but it is a
course, I predict, our people will ultimately regret.”51
Years of social mobilization had impressed upon Justice Marshall that the
object of law is to shape how persons inhabit their everyday lives. The
ultimate worth of the Constitution must be judged by its impact on ordinary
folk. The Constitution could remain legitimate and “displace the use of
violence,” he said, only if it were “perceived by all the people as providing
equal justice.”52 “If the system is not believed to be fair, it will be a failure,
for its effectiveness depends almost entirely on its public appearance.”53
Marshall liked to illustrate this point by telling the story of his practice in
Baltimore during the Depression. At the time, the Maryland Court of
Appeals would not accept a case until the complete record, including a
printed transcript, had been filed.54
This was not a serious barrier for the banks and large businesses represented
by prominent law firms in the city. But often it was an insurmountable
obstacle for poor criminal defendants and struggling shopkeepers, the sort
of clients that I represented. . . . Once I complained to a clerk . . . that this
was not fair to my impoverished Negro clients. His reply was simple:
“Every man has his day in court—if he can pay.”55

A legal system, not in fact accessible because of arbitrary differences in
wealth, is not likely to appear fair and hence not likely to retain its legitimacy
among ordinary citizens. Throughout his time on the bench Marshall was
frustrated with judges who forgot this simple fact. So when the Court in
United States v. Kras56 in 1973 upheld a $50 filing fee for bankruptcy
petitions, which could be paid in average weekly payments of $1.92, in part
on the grounds that this is “less than the price of a movie and little more than
the cost of a pack or two of cigarettes,”57 Marshall erupted in anger:
It may be easy for some people to think that weekly savings of less
than $2 are no burden. But no one who has had close contact with poor
people can fail to understand how close to the margin of survival many of
them are. . . . A pack or two of cigarettes may be, for them, not a routine
purchase but a luxury indulged in only rarely. The desperately poor almost
never go to see a movie, which the majority seems to believe is an almost
weekly activity. . . .

50. Id. at 804.
51. Id. at 814–15.
52. Thurgood Marshall, Address at the Eighth Conference on the Law of the World (Aug.
23, 1977), in THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND
REMINISCENCES, supra note 10, at 256, 259.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 259–60.
56. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
57. Id. at 449.
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It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the Constitution
requires. But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be
premised upon unfounded assumptions about how people live.58

Commentators often observe that this passage illustrates Marshall’s
commitment to the virtue of judicial “empathy.”59 But I prefer to think of it
as instead expressing the hard-earned lesson of a lifetime of striving for legal
reform. Marshall had been able to change the content of American
constitutional law precisely because so many ordinary Americans regarded
that law as unfair and hence as illegitimate. As a judge, he did not want to
perpetuate constitutional law that would be similarly vulnerable. He
understood his judicial task to be the creation of constitutional law that would
be more stable and solid, and that meant appreciating how the doctrine he
articulated would be received by the public, by everyone in the public and
not just by legal elites.
In Marshall’s view, the only way to underwrite the solidity and legitimacy
of constitutional law was to make it true to fundamental democratic
principles of equality that would be accepted by all. This meant constructing
constitutional law along lines that all could appreciate as embodying fairness
in their everyday lives. This was the only way to guarantee both the
normative and sociological legitimacy of constitutional law.
Marshall struggled to find a doctrinal language in which to express this
insight. His efforts are mostly evident in dissents, because Marshall had the
misfortune to join the Court just as it began its rightward turn under the
weight of Richard Nixon’s appointments.60 Yet a good illustration of the
kind of approach that Marshall advocated might be seen in his opposition to
the “tiers of scrutiny” framework of equal protection law.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,61 for example,
the Court rejected a challenge to the economic inequality produced by
Texas’s system of funding schools.62 The Court held that elevated scrutiny
was required neither by the fact that the right to education was at stake nor
by the fact that the funding of school districts differed dramatically based
upon wealth.63 Wealth was not a suspect classification, nor was education a
fundamental right. Hence it need only be shown that the Texas system had
“some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.”64

58. Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. See, e.g., Arrie W. Davis, The Richness of Experience, Empathy, and the Role of a
Judge: The Senate Confirmation Hearings for Judge Sonia Sotomayor, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 1,
17–18 (2009); Veronica Couzo, Note, Sotomayor’s Empathy Moves the Court a Step Closer
to Equitable Adjudication, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 406–10 (2013).
60. In an inspiring but ultimately discouraging essay by a former Marshall clerk, Deborah
Rhode, we learn that “[b]y his own account, Marshall was the most likely to get the decisions
‘least likely to be cited by any person for any purpose under any circumstances.’” Deborah L.
Rhode, Letting the Law Catch Up, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1265 (1992).
61. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
62. Id. at 18.
63. Id. at 35–39.
64. Id. at 40.
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Marshall famously disagreed with this “rigidified approach to equal
protection analysis.”65 For him the intensity of judicial scrutiny should
instead be determined by a sliding scale based upon “the constitutional and
societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is
drawn.”66 The creation of such a sliding scale would make equal protection
law more responsive to ordinary expectations of justice. Everyone knew the
importance of education in modern society; everyone could experience the
sting of having wealthy school districts offer a better education than poor
districts. But the rigid tiers of scrutiny applied by the Court rendered federal
constitutional law deliberately indifferent to these perceptions.
The Court’s majority objected to Marshall’s reasoning on the ground that
it would turn the Court into “a super-legislature” that could arbitrarily pick
and choose when and how to deploy elevated scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.67 The Court was more concerned with creating doctrine
that would constrain judicial discretion by establishing sharp, bright lines,
than with using law as a flexible instrument to acknowledge and respond to
popular demands for justice.
Rodriguez exemplifies a tension that exists within all legal systems.
Judges must simultaneously attend both to the systemic discipline and order
of the legal system and to the responsiveness of that system to the
expectations of those whom the system serves. It is not accidental that the
very judges whom Marshall (accurately) describes as the leading lights of the
Second Circuit—Learned Hand, Henry Friendly, Augustus Hand—are
judges acknowledged to be virtuosos in designing the internal architecture of
the legal system.
But Marshall, by virtue of his remarkable pre-judicial experience, brought
a different emphasis to his judging. He focused deeply on the external
legitimacy of the legal system.
Lawyers sometimes tell themselves that if they just attend rigorously and
rightly to the internal demands of the legal system, the system will legitimate
itself in the eyes of the public. But this far oversimplifies the matter. We
can learn from Marshall that if the internal doctrinal structure of the legal
system grows disconnected from the expectations of its audience, the system
will lose external legitimacy. The slide toward distrust and disaffection can
corrode support for the rule of law. At its worst, it can produce severe
exogenous shocks to the coherence of the internal architecture of the system,
as occurred during the crises of the New Deal or Dred Scott.
* * *
So the question I leave with you is this: Alongside our wonder at the
brilliance of judges like Hand and Friendly, can we equally appreciate the
65. Id. at 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 99.
67. Id. at 31 (majority opinion).
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professional dexterity of a judge like Marshall, who, true to the experience
that had made him a genuine American hero, stressed the expectations and
values of those authorized to endow the legal system with their faith and
trust?
Do we today honor Thurgood Marshall merely for his pre-judicial heroism,
or do we also appreciate his philosophy of judging, which is a direct
expression of that heroism, and which seeks perennially to attach judicial
decision-making to the great, immanent democratic principles of the
Constitution that legitimate the rule of law among the American population?
Sadly, it is commonplace now to acknowledge that American society is in
crisis. Marshall long ago diagnosed and predicted the coming predicament.
In his most eloquent speech, his acceptance of the Liberty Medal at
Independence Hall in 1992, he said:
[A]s I look around, I see not a Nation of unity but of division—Afro and
White, indigenous and immigrant, rich and poor, educated and illiterate. . . .
[T]here is a price to be paid for division and isolation . . . .
We cannot play ostrich. Democracy just cannot flourish amid fear. Liberty
cannot bloom amid hate. Justice cannot take root amid rage. . . . We must
dissent from the fear, the hatred and the mistrust. We must dissent from a
nation that has buried its head in the sand, waiting in vain for the needs of
its poor, its elderly, and its sick to disappear and just blow away. . . . We
must dissent from the poverty of vision and the absence of moral
leadership. We must dissent because America can do better, because
America has no choice but to do better.68

As a judge, Marshall worked hard to create a judicial philosophy adequate to
these moving and prescient insights.
I suggest that a Thurgood Marshall Lecture, in this magnificent courthouse
of justice, can offer no more fitting tribute than to illuminate and praise that
lost constitutional jurisprudence.

68. Thurgood Marshall, Liberty Medal Acceptance Speech at Independence Hall (July 4,
1992) (transcript available at https://constitutioncenter.org/liberty-medal/recipients/thurgoodmarshall [https://perma.cc/D4AB-29Q5]).

